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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                    
No. 03-4491
                    
DALE A. MUST,
                                        Appellant
v.
WEST HILLS POLICE DEPARTMENT;
DEPARTMENT OFFICER JAMES STUTZMAN;
DEPARTMENT OFFICER EDWARD FISHER;
DEPARTMENT OFFICER JERRY K. BELLAK;
DEPARTMENT OFFICER MARK BRITTON
                    
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
D.C. Civil No. 99-cv-00111J
District Judge:  The Honorable Robert J. Cindrich
                    
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
February 7, 2005  
                    
Before: BARRY, FUENTES, and BECKER, Circuit Judges
                    
(Opinion Filed:March 16, 2005)
                    
OPINION
                    
     Given our conclusion that all four of the Officer-defendants are entitled to qualified1
immunity, we need not differentiate between them.  
2
BARRY, Circuit Judge
This appeal involves a claim by Dale A. Must, brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
that the actions of Officers of the West Hills Police Department violated his Fourth
Amendment rights.  After concluding that the Officers were entitled to qualified
immunity and that Must had failed to establish a cognizable basis for municipal liability,
the District Court granted summary judgment in favor of all defendants.  We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and will affirm.  
I.
Because we write only for the parties, we will limit our discussion of the facts to
those which are material to our disposition of this appeal.  The substance of Must’s
section 1983 claim derives from three separate encounters involving himself and various
Officers  of the West Hills Police Department (“WHPD”).1
The first encounter occurred on March 2, 1997.  The WHPD received a call from
one of Must’s neighbors indicating that Must was acting strangely, attempting to enter
parked vehicles, and running onto porches in the neighborhood.  Must admits that he had
been doing wind sprints “up and down the alley just to get rid of built up anxiety.” 
Deposition of Dale A. Must, at 24.  Two Officers arrived at Must’s residence, a residence
he shared with his mother, and observed him piling up various items in a common
     The mental health workers at Crisis Intervention are the county officials responsible2
for processing petitions for involuntary examinations.  If a Crisis Intervention worker
concludes that an involuntary examination is justified, he or she may issue a warrant
authorizing the police to take the person to a medical facility for examination.  See 50 Pa.
Cons. Stat. § 7302(a) (2004); Doby v. DeCrescenzo, 171 F.3d 858, 864-65 (3d Cir. 1999). 
We will refer to these written authorizations as “section 7302 warrants.”  See Doby, 171
F.3d at 865.  
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driveway adjacent to the property.  When the Officers asked Must about his behavior, he
replied that the items “were my personal affects to do with what I want, I mean, if I
choose to throw them out.”  Id. at 22.  Must also told the Officers that he had recently
married and was waiting for Congressman Murtha to come and pick him up for the
purpose of presenting Must with an award, although he now contends that these
statements were intended to be sarcastic.  
After conversing with Must, the Officers contacted Michelle Tomera, a Crisis
Intervention worker,  who was prepared to travel to the location to observe him directly. 2
While one of the Officers was giving Tomera directions, the other Officer indicated that
Must had agreed to be taken to the hospital for evaluation.  Must denies that he gave his
consent.  Based on her understanding that Must had agreed to be transported to the
hospital, Tomera arranged to meet Must and the Officers at the hospital.  Must was
subsequently placed in a police cruiser and taken to the hospital for a psychiatric
evaluation.
At some point after Must arrived at the hospital, Tomera completed a section 7302
warrant authorizing a psychiatric evaluation.  Must became violent with hospital
     Appellees claim that, after questioning Maggs, the Officers contacted Crisis3
Intervention and were informed that the incident did not warrant a psychiatric evaluation. 
Thereafter, appellees contend, Must was promptly released with a warning not to return to
the location.
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attendants and was forcibly restrained.  The physician who conducted his evaluation
diagnosed him as severely mentally disabled.  As a result, Must was involuntarily
committed for observation and treatment.
The second encounter at issue took place on March 10, 1997.  Another neighbor,
Christen Maggs, telephoned the WHPD to complain that Must had been lingering on her
back porch for a period of 30-45 minutes.  Maggs stated that Must had also attempted to
open the basement door to her home.  Upon arriving at Maggs’ residence, the responding
Officers observed Must standing on the back porch and looking into a window.  Must told
the Officers that he was locked out of his house and that he wanted to use Maggs’ phone
to call his mother so she would let him in.
At this point, the Officers placed Must in the police cruiser and proceeded to
interview Maggs.  The remaining details of this incident are disputed.   Must claims that3
he was patted down and handcuffed by the Officers prior to being placed in the cruiser,
and not read his Miranda warnings.  According to Must, the Officers then drove him to
the police station where he was held in an office for a period of 45 minutes before being
driven back to his home.  He concedes that he was not questioned by any Officer during
this period of time.   
     Once again, the parties dispute the issue of whether Must voluntarily agreed to be4
taken to the hospital.  For purposes of this appeal, we will assume, arguendo, that Must
did not consent to the transport.
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The final encounter occurred on June 27, 1998.  Must’s mother contacted the
police complaining that he had broken a glass table top in their home and had threatened
her with a frying pan.  She further indicated that she wanted him to vacate the residence
and asked that he be evaluated by mental health officials.  Officers subsequently located
Must in the vicinity of the residence, and he denied breaking the table or threatening his
mother.  When informed that his mother no longer wanted him to live with her, Must
suggested that the Officers take him to the home of a friend, Tom Hoffman.  The Officers
contacted Crisis Intervention workers, who agreed to meet with Must at Hoffman’s
residence.
After meeting with Must, his mother, and the Officers, the Crisis Intervention
workers suggested to Must that he be taken to the hospital for evaluation.  Feeling that he
had no choice in the matter, he agreed.   He was again given a psychiatric evaluation at4
the hospital, pursuant to a section 7302 warrant signed by David Quinn from Crisis
Intervention.  Must was committed for involuntary treatment based on a physician’s
diagnosis that he had a severe mental disability.  In the early-morning hours of June 28,
however, he was reexamined at the request of his attorney by a different physician, who
concluded that Must did not pose an imminent threat to either himself or others.  Given
this new diagnosis, Must was released.  
     Given our conclusion that each of the Officers is entitled to qualified immunity, we5
need not address appellees’ contention that Must’s claim against Officer Mark Britton
was barred by the statute of limitations.
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II.
Our review of the District Court’s grant of summary judgment is de novo.  Kopec
v. Tate, 361 F.3d 772, 775 (3d Cir. 2004).  Summary judgment is appropriate when a
review of the record demonstrates “that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(c).  We are required to view the facts in the light most favorable to Must, the non-
moving party, and accept his allegations as true provided that they are reasonably
supported by the record.  Kopec, 361 F.3d at 775.
Must named four individual Officers of the WHPD and the WHPD itself as
defendants in this action.  Because the legal standards governing the potential liability of
these two classes of defendants are different, we will discuss the individual and municipal
defendants separately.    
A. Individual Defendants5
Qualified immunity shields an executive official from suit under section 1983 so
long as the officer’s “conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”  Berg v. County
of Allegheny, 219 F.3d 261, 272 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.
800, 818 (1982)).  When considering a claim of qualified immunity, the threshold inquiry
7is whether the officer’s alleged conduct violated a constitutional right.  Saucier v. Katz,
533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001).  “If no constitutional right would have been violated were the
allegations established, there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified
immunity.”  Id.
Even if the plaintiff’s submissions are sufficient to make out a constitutional
violation, the officer remains entitled to immunity “when she makes a decision that . . .
reasonably misapprehends the law governing the circumstances she confronted.” 
Brosseau v. Haugen, 125 S. Ct. 596, 599 (2004).  At this stage of the analysis, the
question is whether the constitutional right that the officer has allegedly violated was
“clearly established” at the time he or she acted.  Id.  In other words, qualified immunity
will apply unless “it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful
in the situation he confronted.”  Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202. 
Must’s lone constitutional argument is that the Officers’ actions on each of the
three encounters in question violated the Fourth Amendment.  It is well settled that the
Fourth Amendment applies to seizures made for civil purposes, and the central inquiry is
the same as in the criminal context—whether the government’s conduct was reasonable
under the circumstances.  Doby, 171 F.3d at 871.  
In Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987), the Supreme Court held that states
may act without satisfying the normally applicable warrant and probable cause
requirements where “special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make
8[those requirements] impracticable.”  Id. at 873 (citations omitted).  Adopting the
reasoning of the First Circuit in McCabe v. Life-Line Ambulance Serv., Inc., 77 F.3d 540
(1st Cir. 1996), we concluded in Doby that “the temporary involuntary commitment of
those deemed dangerous to themselves or others qualifies as a ‘special need’ permitting
the state to act without a warrant.”  171 F.3d at 871.   Doby examined the constitutionality
of an involuntary examination conducted pursuant to section 7302(a)(1) of the
Pennsylvania Mental Health Procedures Act (“MHPA”), which authorizes the seizure of a
mentally disabled person following the issuance of a section 7302 warrant, and concluded
that the statutory scheme set forth in section 7302(a)(1) satisfies the requirements of the
Fourth Amendment.  See 50 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 7302(a)(1) (2004); Doby, 171 F.3d at 872
(observing that the section 7302 warrant is “authorized by a neutral and detached
official”).
The First Circuit distinguished McCabe in Ahern v. O’Donnell, 109 F.3d 809 (1st
Cir. 1997), and declined to extend the special needs exception to a provision of the
Massachusetts involuntary commitment statute that closely resembles section 7302(a)(2)
of the MHPA.  109 F.3d at 817 (“Where, as here, we are arguably dealing with a police
officer’s own decision – rather than that of an impartial expert – we think that Fourth
Amendment standards require a showing of probable cause.”).  The First Circuit held that
an officer making an “emergency seizure” of an apparently mentally disabled individual
without first consulting a neutral mental health official must demonstrate “circumstances
9warranting a reasonable belief that the person to be seized does . . . have a mental health
condition threatening serious harm to himself or others.”  Id. at 817.  Other courts of
appeals have agreed.  See id. at 817 n. 5 (collecting cases).  
We have not yet addressed whether Doby extends to emergency seizures not
authorized by a section 7302 warrant.  For purposes of this appeal, we will assume
without deciding that seizures made pursuant to section 7302(a)(2), 50 Pa. Cons. Stat. §
7302(a)(1) (“Emergency Examination Without a Warrant”), must be supported by
probable cause.
With these principles in mind, we return to the three encounters cited by Must.  
1. March 2, 1997
Because Must claims that the Officers transported him to the hospital without his
consent prior to the involvement of Crisis Intervention, we will consider this seizure as
having been made pursuant to section 7302(a)(2) of the MHPA.  Accordingly, given our
previously discussed assumption concerning the scope of Doby, we would be required to
ask, for the purpose of determining whether a Fourth Amendment violation occurred,
whether the Officers had probable cause to believe that Must presented an imminent
threat of serious bodily harm to either himself or others at the time of the seizure.  See,
e.g., S.P. v. City of Takoma Park, 134 F.3d 260, 266 (4th Cir. 1998); Ahern, 109 F.3d at
817; Pino v. Higgs, 75 F.3d 1461, 1468 (10th Cir. 1996).
We need not reach that issue here, however, because even assuming that Must
     We cannot, however, endorse appellees’ attempt to characterize the seizure which6
occurred (a 45 minute detention at the police station, according to Must’s allegations) as a
mere Terry stop.
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could establish that a constitutional right had been violated, the governing law was not
clearly established.  The Supreme Court has explained that the shield of qualified
immunity will apply unless the law “put the officer on notice that his conduct would be
clearly unlawful.”  Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202; see also City of Takoma Park, 134 F.3d at
266 (“Officials are not liable for bad guesses in gray areas; they are liable for
transgressing bright lines.”).  Must has failed to direct our attention to case law that would
have put the Officers on notice that his indisputably strange behavior did not rise to a
level justifying an involuntary psychiatric evaluation.  The fact that in Doby a related
provision of the MHPA passed Fourth Amendment muster only bolsters our conclusion
that qualified immunity should apply here.  
2. March 10, 1997
We accept appellees’ argument that this incident should be analyzed as a “more
mainstream Fourth Amendment seizure.”  Therefore, we will consider whether the
Officers had probable cause to make a criminal arrest.6
“[A] warrantless arrest by a law officer is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment
where there is probable cause to believe that a criminal offense has been or is being
committed.”  Devenpeck v. Alford, 125 S. Ct. 588, 593 (2004).  Here, there was ample
evidence that Must had committed one or more criminal offenses.  His arrest, therefore,
11
was supported by probable cause.  Because no constitutional violation occurred, section
1983 liability cannot be premised on this encounter.
3. June 27, 1998
As a factual matter, this incident is materially distinguishable from the events of
March 2, 1997.  On that occasion, Must was transported to the hospital before any worker
from Crisis Intervention became meaningfully involved in the process.  Here, by contrast,
it is undisputed that Crisis Intervention workers met with Must in person, spoke with
witnesses, and ultimately recommended that he submit to a psychiatric evaluation.  Thus,
it was the workers from Crisis Intervention, and not the Officers themselves, who made
the determination that an evaluation was warranted.   We, therefore, find that the
Officers’ actions conformed to the parameters of section 7302(a)(1) of the MHPA, the
precise section of that Act which we considered and approved in Doby.  We again
conclude that no constitutional violation occurred.
In sum, the Officers are entitled to qualified immunity as to each of the three
encounters described in Must’s complaint.  Accordingly, we will affirm the District
Court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of the individual defendants.
B. Municipal Defendant
The unconstitutional acts of a municipality’s employees cannot be imputed to the
principal on a theory of respondeat superior.  Berg v. County of Allegheny, 219 F.3d 261,
275 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978)).  In
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order to hold a municipality liable under section 1983, the plaintiff must demonstrate that
any violation of Fourth Amendment rights that occurred was caused by a policy or custom
of the municipality.  Berg, 219 F.3d at 275.  “Once a [section] 1983 plaintiff identifies a
municipal policy or custom, he must demonstrate that, through its deliberate conduct, the
municipality was the ‘moving force’ behind the injury alleged.”  Id. at 276 (quotation
omitted).
In limited circumstances, the failure to adequately train municipal employees may 
establish liability under section 1983.  As a general rule, the plaintiff must provide
evidence of a pattern of constitutional violations in order to premise municipal liability on
a failure-to-train theory.  See id.  The Supreme Court, however, has created a limited
exception to this principle.  In circumstances where “a violation of federal rights [is] a
highly predictable consequence of a failure to equip law enforcement officers with
specific tools to handle recurring situations,” a section 1983 plaintiff may assert a failure-
to-train claim without establishing a pattern of violations.  Bd. of the County Comm’rs v.
Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 409 (1997).
Must takes the position that the WHPD is liable on a failure-to-train theory.  We
disagree.  The only incident which arguably involved a constitutional violation  – March
2, 1997 – was problematic for the sole reason that, because we must view the facts in
light most favorable to Must, the Officers mistakenly advised Tomera that Must had
agreed to be transported to the hospital for a psychiatric evaluation.  Until that point, the
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Officers were prepared to wait for Tomera to arrive at Must’s residence for the purpose of
determining whether a section 7302 warrant should issue.   The record indicates that on
every other occasion the Officers followed a policy of contacting workers from Crisis
Intervention and awaiting their assessment of Must’s mental health.  In our view, the
“moving force” behind any constitutional violation which may have occurred on March 2,
1997 was the individual Officers’ miscommunication concerning Must’s willingness to
agree to a transport and not any shortcoming in the training provided by the WHPD.  See
Berg, 219 F.3d at 276.  
We, therefore, conclude that the District Court properly granted summary
judgment to the municipal defendant, the WHPD.  
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
